Paris

French election is on a knife edge

  • The president, Emmanuel Macron, called a snap parliamentary election in France in the hope that the threat of a far-right Rassemblement National (RN) government would force other more centrist parties to work together under his leadership. 
  • In so doing, he has taken a massive gamble that could well backfire. It is far from clear that the centre-left and centre-right parties will agree to work with his party, Renaissance. 
  • There are two possible routes to power for the RN. If it secures a parliamentary majority (289 out of 577 seats), Mr Macron would invite the party to form a government, with 28-year old Jordan Bardella as the next prime minister. If it is close to a majority and Mr Macron cannot form a majority through alliances with other parties, he may nevertheless appoint Mr Bardella as prime minister.
  • The polls do not currently indicate that the RN will secure a majority. The next government is therefore likely to be a minority administration, with Mr Macron likely to prefer a centrist alliance. It will struggle to pass any significant legislation. 
  • There is an extremely high risk (close to 50%) that the RN wins power. In the run-up to the June 30th election, the RN may gain further ground, particularly if Mr Bardella performs well in a televised debate between party leaders on June 25th.

A surprise election

For many within Renaissance, the most surprising aspect of the decision to call a snap election was the timing. After two years of minority government and the passage of unpopular policies such as the pensions reform, Renaissance was floundering in the polls. The moderate right-wing Les Républicains (LR), which had been tacitly propping up the government, indicated that it would be willing to support a vote of no confidence in the autumn. However, many expected Mr Macron to get through the forthcoming Olympics (to be held in Paris) and then consider his options after the summer recess.

Instead, Mr Macron decided to do things on his own schedule and dissolve parliament in the immediate aftermath of the (disastrous) European elections. His rationale was that the strength of the far right could be a useful lever for forcing other moderate parties to overcome their antipathy towards him and agree to work together so that his government could pass legislation, rather than having to resort to pushing things through by decree. The gamble was designed to take down the two “extremes” on the right (in the form of the Rassemblement national, or RN) and left (La France insoumise, or LFI) and reinforce the centre ground.

Mr Macron’s popularity is already so low that his party has asked him to step back from the campaign, which is being led by the prime minister, Gabriel Attal. Mr Macron’s belief that he could emerge victorious was based on the assumption that parties of the left would be unable to work together. The extremely tight timeframe of the election was intended to catch left-wing parties off their guard and prevent them from having enough time to reach a collective position. However, the rapid formation of a left-wing electoral alliance, the Nouveau front populaire (NFP), which includes the full range of left-wing parties from LFI to the centrist wing of the Parti socialiste (PS), has undermined Mr Macron’s strategy. He has underestimated the potential of the left to emerge as a viable alternative to the far right.

Implications of a RN-led government

Based on current polls, the RN looks unlikely to obtain an absolute majority and other major parties would have to help it if the party wanted to form a government. The RN has rejected the prospect of working with the other far-right party, Reconquête!, and LR has tried to depose its leader for suggesting forming an alliance with the RN. Nonetheless, the RN could form a minority government if its current lead in the polls translates into it becoming the largest party in parliament, and if other parties are unable to join forces to outnumber it. Mr Bardella has stated that he would only govern if the RN had a majority, but this may be a rallying cry to increase the party’s vote share.

A minority RN administration would struggle to govern effectively. The minority government of the past two years has also struggled despite enjoying two advantages that the RN would not have: the support of the president and a deeply divided opposition. Even if opposition parties could not find enough common ground to form an alternative government, they would at least be united in their antipathy towards the RN and their willingness to block legislation put forward by a far-right government.

Meanwhile, Mr Macron, whose powers would be significantly curtailed in a scenario of “cohabitation” with a government from another party, would still have an enviable platform from which to criticise the government, while also being able to mitigate the impact on foreign policy. However, a far-right government would still be able to push through budgetary legislation and one additional bill per parliamentary session using constitutional clause 49.3 to override parliament. As a result, its power would be constrained, but not entirely curtailed. If the RN did form a government the best scenario for Mr Macron would be to hope that its incapacity to govern would discredit it and diminish its electoral appeal ahead of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2027.

Implications of an NFP-led government

An alternative scenario would be a government led by the NFP. It is currently sitting only a few points behind the RN in the polls, and the balance of power within the left is shifting from the far left back towards the more moderate (and electable) PS. Even if it does not manage to overtake the RN, it is poised to finish in second place, and if it were able to bring parties of the centre on board, it could have enough seats to form a minority government. Its strength lies in its ability to provide an alternative both to the far right and to Mr Macron; its weakness lies in the difficulty of including the far left in a coalition seeking to reclaim swing voters. LFI is running more candidates than the PS, but the growing strength of the latter means that it is keen to produce the next prime minister—one of many points of contention between the parties that have continued to cause tension since the formation of the initial pact.

Another key question is the relationship between Mr Macron and a government led by the left. One problem is Mr Macron’s antipathy towards LFI and his reluctance to support any coalition that includes a party that he has labelled as extremist and undemocratic. Another problem is the broader antipathy across the left towards Mr Macron. A minority NFP-led government would face similar challenges to one led by the RN. The NFP would also find itself at constant risk of internal fracture, given that its electoral coalition is built out of necessity and glosses over some profound ideological disagreements across the component parties.

Implications of a centrist coalition including Renaissance

The third scenario—the one that Mr Macron was hoping for—would be an alliance of moderate parties spanning the centre-left to the centre-right. The ousting of Eric Ciotti as leader of LR enables the remaining party members to reverse their recent lurch to the right of the spectrum and resume a more moderate stance. The bigger challenge would be to persuade the PS to ditch LFI (with whom they have significant differences of opinion) and shift towards the centre ground. The return of a former president, François Hollande, whose liberal policies took the party from pre-eminence in 2012 to near-extinction in 2017, is an indication that the PS are preparing to reclaim the centre ground. However, such is the mutual contempt between Mr Hollande and his former protégé that Mr Macron has lent his support to the LR candidate running against Mr Hollande. The willingness of the PS to switch from the NFP to a centrist coalition is therefore unlikely unless LFI refuses to give the PS key leadership roles. If the PS had the choice between accepting an LFI prime minister or becoming the leading party within a more centrist coalition, it is possible that they might choose the latter. This opens up the possibility of collaboration, a Republican “grand coalition” that would include the PS, LR and the various parties of the centre.

The overall picture is one of considerable uncertainty. Three quite different scenarios are plausible, and, in a situation of rapid change, other options may also emerge. What each of these scenarios has in common is fragility; with no party set to obtain a majority of seats, and with Mr Macron’s party unlikely to lead in any scenario, the next government is likely to comprise a minority government in cohabitation with a president of a different party, and/or a fragile alliance of parties whose ideological differences will be hard to overcome. It is not unthinkable that a period of chaos or gridlock will result, culminating in yet another parliamentary election.

The analysis and forecasts featured in this article are accessible through EIU’s Country Analysis service. This comprehensive solution provides unmatched global insights covering the political and economic outlook for nearly 200 countries, enabling organisations to identify potential opportunities and risks effectively.