US hopes to influence Israel’s stance on war

What’s happened?

On October 14th the US delivered the first components of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile‑defence system—which will be operated by 100 US troops—to Israel. According to media reports, Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, subsequently informed Joe Biden, the US president, that Israel would not strike Iranian nuclear or energy facilities in its widely expected retaliatory attack in response to Iran’s missile barrage against Israel earlier in the month. We expect Israel to broadly align with the US on this issue and to strike a military target in Iran in the coming weeks.

Why does it matter?

The US and Israel have been engaged in intense negotiations about the targets of a probable Israeli attack in retaliation for Iran’s October 1st missile attack against Israel. Despite the US’s long-standing position as Israel’s closest ally and main security guarantor, the US has struggled to influence or restrain Israeli military actions since the outbreak of the Israel‑Hamas war both in the Gaza conflict and, since late September, in Israel’s intense offensive against Hizbullah, an Iranian-sponsored Lebanese Shia group.

Mr Netayanhu has had a testy relationship with Mr Biden and has reportedly made promises to him that were broken later. Mr Netanyahu has also made clear that the final decision about targeting Iran would depend on Israel’s own national interests, but taking a stance that could be seen to influence the outcome of the US elections (which take place on November 5th) could also prove to be counter-productive for Israel. Israel also risks opening a third major front, if it selects a target that would trigger a sustained confrontation with Iran.

The US is struggling to balance providing security protection to Israel while not emboldening Israel to act beyond what the US views as its broader regional and global security interests. Although the Biden administration has explicitly acknowledged Israel’s right to retaliate against the direct attack from Iran, it is concerned that an attack on Iranian oil installations would knock out enough global supply to raise petroleum prices or prompt a wider regional conflagration (not our central scenario).

An Israeli attack on Iranian oil facilities would potentially be viewed by the regime there as a systemic threat and could not only provoke a major retaliation directed against Israel but could also trigger an acceleration of Iran’s nuclear programme or attacks on Saudi and other Gulf oil installations (not our main scenario), which would drive up international oil prices further. The US believes (and so do many in Israel) that an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities stands a poor chance of succeeding, owing to Israel’s lack of bunker-busting bombs powerful enough to destroy sites lying deep underground. In addition, an unsuccessful Israeli attack might prompt Iran to accelerate its nuclear weapons programme.

Moreover, Israel’s ability to defy the US on this issue is constrained by concerns about its ability to withstand an Iranian counter-attack as effectively as it has defended itself against past missile attacks. Media reports say that the last Iranian attack depleted much of Israel’s stock of Arrow (anti-ballistic missiles) and David’s Sling (a system developed jointly by Israel and the US to counter longer‑range missiles) anti-missile missiles, which are the main components of Israel’s own highly developed interception systems—hence the Israeli request for the THAAD system to fortify its ability to counter ballistic missiles.

What next?

Once the THAAD becomes operational, we expect an Israeli targeted strike in the coming weeks. Israel will probably choose from among an array of Iranian military targets, including missile and drone launchers, storage sites and factories, as well as military bases and possibly major government buildings. Given Iran’s reluctance to be drawn into direct conflict with Israel, we expect it to absorb this attack, but fighting in Gaza and Lebanon will continue into early 2025. However, the risk of further escalation remains high.

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