Taiwan Strait

Xi-Ma meeting carries little geopolitical significance

What’s happened?

On April 10th Xi Jinping, China’s president, received Ma Ying-jeou‑, Taiwan’s former president (2008‑16), in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing (the Chinese capital). The meetings were largely orchestrated for China’s domestic audience, and have no bearing on our forecasts for the development of relations across the Taiwan Strait.

Why does it matter?

Mr Ma had previously met with Mr Xi in Singapore in 2015. He is very influential in Taiwan’s largest opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), which espouses a China‑sympathetic stance and supports eventual unification between the two sides. Mr Ma’s actions do not, however, represent Taiwan’s current government—led by the China‑sceptic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), with which China has refused to engage since it came into power in 2016—while his pro-China actions in recent years are increasingly out-of-step with mainstream Taiwanese opinion.

Nevertheless, the meeting between Mr Xi and Mr Ma carry strong symbolism. Mr Xi, for his part, used the occasion to signal his friendliness towards Taiwanese who support a more pro‑China stance. Mr Xi also likely meant for the meetings to suggest to China’s domestic audience that support for “unification” still exists in Taiwan. These hopes contrast sharply with the current political reality: the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese do not identify with China, and support for unification is incredibly unpopular. Nevertheless, these same dynamics support our view that China remains hesitant around using force to “resolve the Taiwan question.” If a war were to occur, it would more likely than not be the result of unintended miscalculations.

Mr Ma’s decision to meet with Mr Xi, as well as his pro‑China stance in general, poses political difficulties for the KMT. In recent years, Taiwan’s opposition has struggled to rethink its China‑friendly image, given how this association has undermined its electoral performance (particularly in regard to the presidency). During the latest presidential campaign season, Hou Yu‑ih, the KMT candidate, was forced to explicitly object comments made by Mr Ma arguing against Taiwan increasing its defence spending (predicated on the idea that Taiwan would inevitably lose a war against China). Mr Ma’s enduring influence in the KMT will frustrate the party’s attempts to forge a more distanced stance with China, which will continue to limit its wider popularity among the Taiwanese electorate.

What next?

The meeting carries little-to-no implications for DPP policy setting, including in regard to Taiwan’s relationship with China. We do not expect Mr Xi’s slightly more conciliatory tone to translate into softer rhetoric or military/economic harassment of Taiwan. Instead, we maintain our view that Chinese pressure tactics (including grey-zone tactics) will intensify in May, around the time of the inauguration of Taiwan’s president‑elect, Lai Ching‑te.

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